Supervised machine learning was successfully used in the past to handle the vast amount of uncertainty data in dynamic security assessment (DSA). Classifiers are offline trained on simulated operating conditions and then used in the online operation to identify unreliable conditions in this data. The concept is to shift time-consuming simulations from online to an offline workflow. However, relying online solely on these classifiers requires high accuracies that are not always given. Instead of relying on classifiers this paper focuses on using them to use traditional DSA methods more efficiently. A probabilistic approach on the output of the classifier is explored in more detail and used to navigate online DSA simulations across contingencies. An ensemble classifier is learned and calibrated by using Platt' scaling to provide accurate probability estimates. Subsequently, asymmetric learning is used to adjust a decision threshold and rank operating conditions across contingencies. Simulations are then effectively used to reduce operational risks. At the same time, our approach addresses the asymmetric nature of the learning problem, such as a missed alarm is more critical than a false alarm. Through a case study on a real dataset of the French Transmission Grid, it is showcased how the proposed approach quickly reduces inaccurate predictions and risks. We further study the sensitivity of the approach against inaccurate estimations, such as the probabilities of contingencies. Finally, the scalability to several contingencies and operating conditions is showcased. This is a fundamental step forward to support the development of a full probabilistic DSA that scales to many contingencies.
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I. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The increasing share of renewable energy and the number of flexible devices in modern power grids lead to critical challenges in the operation. These challenges result from the dynamics and uncertainty surrounding the generation of renewables and the interactions of these flexible devices. Existing operating tools of grid operators lack in handling appropriately the risks of these uncertainties and dynamics. Historically, operators maintained the 'N-1 criterion' to securely operate the grid: each asset in the grid could potentially fail and operation must be maintained. Currently, the only way of ensuring secure operations with 'N-1' under dynamics are conservative operations that require large safety margins. Operating securely with large safety margins means to underutilize assets. A smarter way of controlling the grid would allow using assets at capacity and avoiding grid investments in more assets. Hence, new operating tools are needed that ensure security and can handle these dynamics [1] .
A. Toward a Dynamic Security Assessment
The assessment on whether the operation can be maintained post-contingency is done in two parts [2] , Static and Dynamic:
(i) In the Static Security Assessment, the post-fault equilibrium is computed and the local stability is assessed. The state is considered as steady-state stable if the equilibrium is locally stable and all voltages and currents fulfil defined constraints.
(ii) Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) considers whether the system reaches the post-fault equilibrium. This assessment requires simulations of the system responding to a fault and to validate whether the operating limits are maintained in the time domain. These time-domain simulations are computationally intensive; hence dynamics (transients) can currently not being considered in realtime operation as the N-1 criterion would require a very large number of dynamical simulations [3] .
The problem of security assessments is that the 'N-1 criterion' requires many assessments in large grids. One assessment is required for each potential contingency and in large grids the number of potential contingencies is large. In the literature, two approaches were applied to reduce this large number: one is deterministic and the other probabilistic. In deterministic approaches, a static short-list of contingencies classified as impactful is considered [4] , [5] . However, this classification may change over time as it depends for instance on the probabilities of contingencies that can change frequently due to weather changes. In response, these probabilities and the impact of contingencies are considered in probabilistic approaches with promising economic savings [4] , [6] . This shift from operating with the 'N-1 criterion' over a deterministic approach toward a probabilistic approach was well discussed in the past for steady-state (Static) Security Assessment (e.g., [7] , [8] ) and recently reviewed [9] .
Considering dynamics in these probabilistic approaches promises large economic savings [4] , [6] . However, it is a current lack in research to consider dynamics in these approaches and it is key to address it as the future involves more dynamics [1] . Currently, the only way to ensure dynamic stability is to operate with very large safety margins and under-utilize the assets. Not considering dynamics in future' security assessments would further result in under-utilization and missing economic savings being larger than in the past.
We propose an efficient framework supporting the development of a full probabilistic security assessment toward considering dynamics and many contingencies. Initial work toward a probabilistic DSA has been carried out by applying similar approaches from static assessments [10] where an impact (severity) function for transient stability and probability estimates of operating points based on historical failure rates were considered. In [11] , some stability indicators were used for the impact and weather data for the probabilities were forecasted in [12] . Recently, [3] and [13] proposed a risk function to consider the impact of the contingency and the probability that a machine-learning based DSA is inaccurate. In [13] these functions were used to compute control actions.
Statistical machine learning methods when used in a Monte Carlo framework are promising for new DSA tools, as, once trained, they generalize to unforeseen, uncertain operations.
The key advantage to consider machine learning in DSA is that computations are significantly fast. The classical machinelearning based DSA workflow is presented as dashed lines in Fig. 1 . First, a statistical model is fitted to historical operation data, then, a population of operation data likely to occur in the next hours/days is sampled from this model. Next, a list of critical contingencies is simulated for each operating point. In these simulations the security of the dynamic response to these contingencies are assessed. This procedure results in a database that consists out of operation data and corresponding (binary) values measuring the security (reliability) of these operating points. Then, classifiers from machine learning are fitted to this training database, where the features are the prefault operation data and the post-fault response are the binary classes (reliable class and unreliable class) [14] , [15] . Conceptually, the workflow described above can be processed periodically by a Transmission System Operator (TSO) in an offline manner. Then, close to real-time operation, the TSO can use these classifiers to instantly predict the output of a DSA for a very large number of operation data that may occur very soon. The key benefit is that this machine-learning based DSA output is instantaneously available whereas actual DSA would require significant computational budgets close to the real-time operation to perform time-domain simulations; this would be technically infeasible. Hence, the use of machinelearning based DSA is conceptually promising for DSA, however, several challenges still exist.
B. Challenges in Probabilistic & Machine-Learning DSA
The key downside of machine-learning based DSA is that the output of the DSA may be incorrect, whereas actual DSA is always correct as it simulates a model based on physical laws. We discuss three specific challenges considering this key downside and probabilistic DSA approaches.
A first challenge of machine-learning based DSA refers to the fact that the training database of the classifier is typically imbalanced in the shares of the two (binary) classes: many more operating points correspond to the reliable class (in particular the ones from historical records) than to the unreliable class [16] . This imbalance may significantly impact the balance of the predictive accuracy of the classifier. When this imbalance is not addressed, then, typically the classifier is more accurate on the major (here reliable class) than on the minor class (unreliable class). This is an extremely important challenge, as some inaccurate predictions may be hazardous.
A second challenge of machine-learning based DSA has to do with different costs of inaccurate predictions. An inaccurate prediction can be either a false alarm or a missed alarm. A false alarm is when an operating point is predicted as unreliable, though, actually reliable, and a missed alarm is when predicting as reliable, though actually unreliable. Whereas a false alarm may lead to costs that correspond to unnecessarily accounting for preventive and corrective control actions, a missed alarm can be more hazardous. If an alarm is missed, then, load disconnections may be the result (in the worst case a total power blackout may occur) and the corresponding costs may be very high [8] .
A third challenge has to do with navigating the risk and computational requirements of various DSA approaches. The objective of the operator is to minimize the operational risks with limited computational budget. Hence, operating points that entail a particularly high risk should be assessed with actual DSA, rather than exclusively relying on machine-learning based DSA [3] . The challenge is to select (filter) operating points and contingencies that entail high risks.
C. Contributions
For the first time, the proposed approach combines machine learning with traditional DSA methods (actual DSA) to increase their efficiency to ultimately support the development of a full probabilistic DSA scaling to multiple-asset failures.
In the machine-learning based DSA, we propose the following offline workflow: We start by training an initial classifier; we use an ensemble classifier [17] that combines multiple Classification and Regression Tree (CART) [18] classifiers to a single classification output. We select to train this ensemble classifier by using adaptive boosting (AdaBoost) [19] , [20] . Then, we calibrate this ensemble classifier by using Platt scaling [21] in order to obtain accurate probability estimates for the two classes (reliable and unreliable classes). Subsequently, we propose to shift the classification's decision threshold to address the first two mentioned challenges, the class imbalance and the cost-sensitivity of the two classes. These shifts are used in asymmetric learning to minimize the expected cost of inaccurate predictions. We select this cost-based approach as it allows to adjust instantaneously the decision threshold as it varies over time without re-training. The full workflow of these approaches is presented as a combination of dashed and straight lines in Fig. 1 (offline part) . This machine-learning workflow is simple, flexible and has the best performance among a wide-range of boosting variants [22] . Note, apart from the estimates of costs that an inaccurate prediction may entail, which has a physical meaning, no other parameters must be tuned or specified in this workflow. This is a significant advantage over other machine-learning based approaches.
Our probabilistic perspective on DSA provides an operator, for the first time, with guidance on how to combine machinelearning based DSA and actual DSA. In our approach, an operator first uses machine-learning based DSA to compute the operational risks of contingencies and operating points, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . Subsequently, these contingencies and points are ranked based on their risks. Simulations (actual DSA) are performed in this order to assess high-risk contingencies first. This approach allows efficiently using simulations and reduces significantly the amount of data to simulate. This is a fundamental step toward the development of a full probabilistic DSA scaling to multi-asset failures. A case study on the IEEE 6-bus system is used to illustrate the challenges and how our probabilistic perspective outperforms other approaches. Then, the French Transmission system is used to showcase the scaling to multiple contingencies, computational performance as well as the sensitivity of our approach on parameter estimations. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we present our proposed approaches from machine-learning. Thereafter, we present our probabilistic perspective on DSA in Section III that combines machine learning with actual DSA. Subsequently, the case study is presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V is the conclusion.
II. MACHINE-LEARNING BASED DSA To use machine learning in DSA typically involves a binary classification problem. An operating point i of the system can either (a) fulfil some reliability criteria in the time domain when contingency c occurs and is considered as reliable y i,c = 1 or (b) the operating point does not fulfil the criteria and is considered as unreliable y i,c = 0. Binary classification is used to predict this binary label y i,c based on a feature vector x i consisting out of steady-state real values that describe the operating point, such as power injections, loads, phase angles and voltages of the buses. To learn a classifier requires a training database: a population of operating points Ω T , where each operating point i ∈ Ω T corresponds to a feature vector x i and a label y i,c . The population of unreliable operating points at contingency c is Ω T,0
The first challenge is the class imbalance. |Ω T,1 c | > |Ω T,0 c | can be typically observed [16] . | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. This class imbalance can be captured by the two different class priors π 0 c = |Ω T,0 c |/|Ω T | and π 1 c = |Ω T,1 c |/|Ω T |. The second challenge is that the cost of inaccurate predictions differ. The costs of predicting an unreliable operating point as reliable C F 1 c > 0 is typically greater than the costs corresponding to predicting a reliable operating point as unreliable
c . These costs may differ for each contingency c as well.
In fact, the two challenges of skewed classes (π 0 c = π 1 c ) and skewed costs (
, although typically discussed and addressed in different contexts, can be addressed very similarly [23] , [24] . For example, assume C F 1 c = 3C F 0 c , then this is equivalent to adjusting the class priors, which means, in this example, to use each unreliable operating point i ∈ Ω T,0 c three times in the training set. In general, if we define the cost ratio as
then, the adjusted class distributions would bê
Note that we dropped the index for the contingency c for simplicity reasons in Eq. (2) . As just shown, there exist a duality of the problems of skewed cost and skewed classes [22] , thus, the first two challenges can be similarly interpreted and addressed in classification.
B. Classifier training
Here we discuss the training of an ensemble classifier that consists out of many weak classifiers Ω E . Each of these weak classifiers l ∈ Ω E corresponds to a hypothesis h l (x i ) = {0, 1}, which predicts the binary label of operating point i based on feature vector x i . Subsequently, these hypotheses are weighted by w l and combined as a weighted majority vote to obtain the binary label
To learn this ensemble classifier from a training population of operating points Ω T we used Adaptive boosting (AdaBoost) that is an iterative process [19] , [22] , which is here not further discussed. However, the output of an ensemble classifier can be either the predicted binary label H E (x i ), as introduced in Eq. (3), or a score such as
quantifies the weighted and normalized vote for the reliable class 1 of the operating point i (thus, the 1 as a superscript) by accounting for the votes of all weak classifiers Ω E . The score vote of the unreliable class can be calculated through s 1 (x i ) + s 0 (x i ) = 1. These scores can be used to obtain accurate probability estimates after calibrating.
C. Calibration
Calibration is used to convert the score output of a classifier into a probability estimatep 1 (x i ). Also here, the superscript 1 stands for the probability estimate of the reliable class and accordingly the probability estimate for the unreliable class can be calculated throughp 1 (x i ) +p 0 (x i ) = 1. In this calibration, Platt scaling [21] is used as it resulted in the best probability estimates across several calibration methods for boosting classifiers [25] . In Platt scaling, s 1 (x i ) andp 1 (x i ) are mapped by using the sigmoid function
where parameters a and b are fitted by maximizing the likelihood of a separate calibration dataset Ω K of operating points. The performance of this calibration can be quantified by using the Brier score. First, the following sequence of operating points in the calibration set Ω K is defined as k = 1, 2, . . .
Then, this sequence is split into |Ω T | subsets of operating points accordingly to this sequence. Each subset is Ω T t for t = 1, 2, 3, ...|Ω T | and has the same size |Ω T t |. As these subsets are split accordingly to this sequence, the first subset is Ω T 1 = 1, 2, 3, ...|Ω T t |, etc. Subsequently, the average probability estimatesp 1 t and the fraction of reliable operating points π 1 t are calculated for each of these subsets t = 1, 2, 3, ...|Ω T |. Finally, the Brier score is the squared sum of the differences betweenp 1 t and π 1 t as follows
When the Brier score is computed for an uncalibrated classifier the scores 1 replacesp 1 .
D. Shifting the Decision Threshold
We propose to use a shifted decision threshold on the probability estimates to minimize the risk of relying on machine-learning based DSA when there is asymmetry. The risk of predicting an operating point i can be described as a disjunction
where R 1 c (x i ) and R 0 c (x i ) are the risks of predicting operating point i as reliable or unreliable.p 1 (x i ) is the probability estimate obtained from the classifier learned for contingency c and corresponds to Eq. (5) . p C c is the probability estimate that contingency c occurs. Note the similarity of using the probability estimate of the unreliable class p C c as a multiplication with the costs in Eq. (7) , and the equivalence of class and cost skews as described in the beginning of Sec. II.
The operating point i should be predicted with lowest residual risk: this means to predict as reliable iff the risk of predicting as reliable R 1 c is lower than the risk of predicting as unreliable R 0 c , thus iff R 1 c < R 0 c . Given this rationale and Eq. (7), an operating point should be predicted as reliable iff
where z is the shifted decision threshold, which is often also called 'skew' or 'probability cost function (pcf)' [22] , [26] . Note how z simplifies if there exist no cost skew C F 0 c = C F 1 c or/and no class skew p C c = 0.5. Subsequently, the risk of a prediction can be summarized:
III. PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON DSA To ensure reliable power system operations requires the operators to be aware of the future. Close to realtime operation, a set of potential future operating points Ω P may be generated from some predictive model, where each operating point i ∈ Ω P may occur close to real time operation (shortterm operation) with an estimated probability p I i . Then, in DSA, this population of operating points is mapped to potential contingencies Ω C resulting in many potential scenarios Ω S = {(i, c)}| i ∈ Ω P , c ∈ Ω C }. Each contingency c ∈ Ω C may occur with the probability estimate p C c . Typically, p C c is obtained by historical failure rates or other informed methods based on asset lifetime or weather data, as in [27] . These two probability estimates p I i and p C c may change over time. The operator's key task in DSA is to identify the scenarios resulting in unreliable operations. Ideally we would assess each scenario s ∈ Ω S with actual DSAs. However, each actual DSA requires a time-domain simulation that is computationally expensive. This is the key challenge as the number of scenarios is large and the computational budget is limited, hence it is infeasible to assess all scenarios Ω S with simulations.
A. Combining machine-learning and simulations in online
We propose to use machine-learning-based DSA first for assessing all scenarios Ω S as the computational time is negligible and then, assessing a few scenarios with simulations (actual DSA). Here, we consider a single contingency |Ω C | = 1 and assume that the computational budget allows running S time-domain simulations, where typically S |Ω S |. We discuss three approaches to select the scenarios to perform simulations on. The first approach is the standard approach of operators and does not involve any machine learning, the second does account for a standard classifier and the third is our probabilistic perspective that uses advanced information from a classifier.
1) No machine learning: This approach corresponds to not considering machine learning in operations. The only information available to decide without simulation on the reliability of an operating point is the class distribution. Based on this the operator can only randomly select a subset of S operating points to assess with simulations to validate/falsify the assumption on the reliability.
2) Standard classifier: The second approach corresponds to using a standard classifier in machine-learning based DSA. No decision threshold is applied and actual DSA is firstly performed on operating points classified as reliable to reduce missed alarms N 1 c as they typically entail higher costs than false alarms C F 1 c C F 0 c . Then, operating points classified as unreliable are simulated to reduce N 0 c . 3) Probabilistic perspective: The third approach is our proposed approach where we start by computing the risk of relying solely on machine-learning based DSA
where R c (x i ) is the risk of inaccurately predicting operating point i ∈ Ω P from Eq. (9). We have assumed that the probability p I i is not correlated to p C c as p C c is part of R c (x i ). Subsequently, we perform a simple sorting of the operating points based on these risks R
c,i is the jth largest value. Then, we use simulations (actual DSA) on the operating points in this order j = 1, 2, . . . min{|Ω P |, S}. Consequently, the point with the highest risk R (1) c,i is assessed with simulation first.
B. Considering many contingencies
The final objective is to efficiently use the computational budget close to realtime when considering multiple contingencies and operating points mapped as scenarios Ω S . As illustrated in Fig. 2 , each contingency c ∈ Ω C requires to learn one classifier as the boundary of the reliable/unreliable operation is different resulting in a different underlying classification problem. After these classifiers are calibrated, the individual risks of each scenario can be computed as R s = R c,i and, as before, these risks are sorted R (j) s ∀s ∈ Ω S , however, here the sorting is done across scenarios accounting for contingencies and operating points. R (j) s is the jth largest value. Then, we propose to simulate (actual DSA) these scenarios in the order of descending risks j = 1, 2, . . . min{|Ω S |, S} until the maximal computational budget of S simulations is used.
However, R s is not the actual risk of relying on machine learning; it is an estimate of the risk of a single operating point being inaccurately predicted. To study the risk of relying on machine learning requires the use of a testset Ω P . After predicting the output for the testset using Eq. (8), the N 1 c missed and false alarms N 0 c are calculated. Then for these inaccurate predictions the overall risk is calculated as
where equal probability of each operating point p I i = 1 |Ω P | ∀i ∈ Ω P is assumed to be equal across the testset that is the case once a Monte Carlo method is used to perform sampling. Note this risk calculation only considers the risk of machine learning and not other risks such as considering a limit number of operating points, modelling errors, simulation inaccuracies, inaccurate estimations of input parameters, etc. IV. CASE STUDY Our approach is studied on the IEEE 6-bus system and on the French Grid. We start with illustrating the challenges; then how calibration supports obtaining accurate probabilities and how to make cost-effective predictions. We compare our approach against a standard classifier and when not considering machine learning. Our studies consider several contingencies and the sensitivity of parameter estimations required as an input of our approach. Finally, we provide insights into the computational scalability and broadly discuss the approach.
A. Assumptions 1) Test systems: As a first test system the IEEE 6-bus system was used from [28, p. 373-376] considering steady-state stability and the DC-approximation. The pre-fault variables x i of the operating point i were the three loads, the three generator power outputs, six phase angles and eleven line flows. When computing the post-fault labels, corrective actions are taken into account in the form of ±20 MW (re-)dispatches of the generator powers. The loads are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution and a Pearson's correlation coefficient of 0.75 is used between all three load pairs. Then, the loads are converted to a Kumaraswamy(1.6,2.8) distribution by applying the inverse transformation method. Subsequently, the loads are scaled such that all loads were in the range of [50, 150] MW. The generator powers are dispatched by a DC Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF) with a linear cost function with coefficients {12, 10, 8} for the three generators at buses {1, 2, 3}.
As a second test system, the French network was used that had 1955 transmission lines, 798 transformers, 1886 buses, 411 generators and 127 shunt elements. The dataset was also used in [16] , had 16722 operating points, 35873 features and 1980 different contingencies were simulated; 9 different reliability metrics were computed. In our studies the metric for overloads, 5000 operating points (3500 training and 1500 testing) and |Ω C | = 11 contingencies were randomly selected. The estimates for probabilities p c and costs C c of contingencies c ∈ Ω C were randomly selected from {0.00001, 0.00005, 0.0001, 0.0005} and { 500 501 , 1000 1001 , 5000 5001 , 10000 10001 }, respectively. 2) Machine Learning: The single DTs were learned via CART [18] by using the package scikit-klearn 0.18.1 [29] in Python 3.5.2. with default settings, such as minimizing gini impurity; an exception was the restriction of DT depth at 3 to avoid over-fitting. The AdaBoost ensembles were learned by using the algorithm SAMME.R [20] with default parameters, except the number of weak learners was increased to M = 100. The weak learners were DTs and prefitted with CART with maximal depths of 1. A set of |Ω K | = 875 operating points and 3-fold cross-validation was used to calibrate.
B. Challenges: class and cost imbalances
The impact of class imbalances was studied on the IEEE 6 bus system for a three-fault contingency on line 5 connecting buses 2 and 4. The class imbalance is large at π 1 5 = 0.89 versus π 0 5 = 0.11. A DT was trained on |Ω T | = 3500 operating points, and the test error was computed using |Ω P | = 1500 tests; and repeated 10 times for different combinations. Overall the test error was only 0.9 %, however, when disaggregating test error into classes, 0.3 % were false alarms and 5.4 % missed alarms. This imbalance showed that predictions were more accurate on the majority than on the minority class.
The cost imbalance was studied on a fault on line 6 that connected buses 2 and 5. Here, the classes were balanced (π 1 6 = 0.52 and π 0 6 = 0.48) and interference with the classimbalance challenge was avoided. The average test error of 10 DTs was on average 1.4 % and split into 1.4 % false alarms and 1.3 % missed alarms. Although this split of errors is balanced, when assuming an imbalance in the costs of C F 1 6 C F 0 6 , then the overall cost of inaccurate predictions was not minimized as it would correspond to imbalances in the error.
C. Calibrating imbalances
We compared an uncalibrated and calibrated AdaBoost classifier for contingency c = 6 to show how to address imbalances. First, the uncalibrated scores s 1 (x i ) were obtained for the testing set i ∈ Ω P , then sorted and separated into subsets as described in Section II-C.s 1 t was the average score in each subset t = 1, 2, 3, ...|Ω T |. Based ons 1 t and the fraction of reliable operating points π 1 t the reliability diagram was plotted in Fig. 3a (we dropped the index t in the figure) . Then, calibration was performed using |Ω K | = 875 operating points and the average probability estimatesp 1 t were computed for each subset t. Accordingly, the reliability diagram for the calibrated case was plotted in Fig. 3b . The calibrated reliability diagram aligns significantly stronger with the diagonal corresponding to the perfect probability estimates. The Brier scores for the two cases were computed 10 times using Eq. (6). The average Brier score of the uncalibrated case wasB = 0.077 and of the calibrated caseB = 0.003. This reduction in Brier score of 96 % showed that accurate probability estimates require calibration.
D. Cost-effective predictions
In this study, the decision threshold z from Eq. (8) was used to make cost-effective predictions accordingly to the imbalances in costs and classes; different cost imbalances were studied. The probabilities equalled across the operating points and the probability of the contingency equalled the class prior. The actual class labels were compared with the predictions to compute missed N 1 6 and false alarms N 0 6 . These were then used to calculate for each cost imbalance the actual risk Z * 6 according to Eq. (11). This procedure was repeated 10 times and the risk was averaged Z * 6 . The results in Fig. 4 showed that combining a decision threshold with a calibrated classifier reduced risks; however, when using the threshold on the distorted score s 1 of an uncalibrated classifier the risk is high particularly for high-cost ratios C. Hence, the larger the imbalance the more important calibration and decision thresholds become.
E. Machine Learning supported DSA
In this study, the operator had a limited computational budget to analyse S scenarios with dynamic simulations (actual DSAs) close to real-time operation. Contingency c = 3 (connecting buses 1 and 5) was studied from the IEEE 6-bus system with cost of C 3 = 10000 10001 and probability p C 3 = 0.0002. The three approaches of Section III-A were studied as follows.
In the first approach, no machine learning was used; the operator selects randomly S scenarios to simulate. By using a testset of |Ω P | = 1500 the inaccurately assigned classes N 1 3 + N 0 3 were computed for the scenarios that were not simulated. Then, accordingly, the risk was calculated from Eq. (11) . The results in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b show the linear reduction in inaccurately assigned labels and the risk. A traditional operator following the N-1 criterion needs to simulate all points.
In the second approach, a standard classifier was used to focus on missed alarms. The results for inaccurate predictions and risks are shown in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b , respectively. When the computational budget allowed for more simulations S, first N 1 3 dropped to zero at 1205 simulations, then N 0 3 approached zero at 1499 simulations. However, a residual risk remained at any S unless all points were simulated.
In the third, our approach, a calibrated AdaBoost classifier was used to estimate the risk of relying on these predictions and simulations were performed accordingly. The result of inaccurate predictions is shown in Fig. 6c . Initially (S = 0), 20 predictions out of |Ω P | = 1500 were inaccurate. Then, our approach identified these 20 inaccurate predictions after only 59 simulations. Any further of the 1441 simulations were not needed as not reducing inaccuracies or risks. Our approach reduced the number of simulations in comparison to the first approach by 96 %. In terms of risks, our approach reduced risks with a steep slope and approached zero after these 59 simulations as per Fig. 6d . This was a key finding as a traditional operator using the N-1 criterion could significantly reduce the computational effort to analyse each fault while ensuring the same risk tolerance level. 
F. Considering several contingencies
First, the IEEE 6-bus system was used for two contingencies to illustrate before the French Transmission grid was used to showcase the benefits for multiple contingencies. The two contingencies Ω C = {3, 5} were used; parameters from c = 3 as before and parameters for c = 5 were p C 5 = 0.0003 and C 5 = 500 501 . One AdaBoost classifier was trained for each contingency and tested with |Ω P | = 1500 operating points that resulted in |Ω S | = 3000 testing scenarios. After only 104 simulations out of these 3000, all inaccurate predictions were found and the risk drops to zero as presented in Fig.  7 . In the conventional approach, where machine-learning is not involved, all of these 3000 scenarios needs simulating; hence the reduction in computations is 95 % that illustrated the significance of this approach. On the French system, 11 contingencies were considered resulting in 16500 testing scenarios (|Ω S | = 1500 × 11 = 16500). 11 AdaBoost classifiers were trained and used as described in the second and our third approach in Sec. III-A. In Fig. 8a we show the reductions of missed alarms of our approach. When relying only on machine learning 1093 of the 16500 scenarios were inaccurately predicted; hence the test error was 7 %. Our approach reduced these inaccurate predictions by 50 % (547) within the first 2215 simulations. In terms of risks and in comparison with the standard classifier approach, our approach reduced risks much faster (Fig. 8b) . In the standard classifier, the risk decreased slowly and dropped sharply around 15000 simulations. This result implied that the risk of false alarms was higher than of missing alarms. In our approach the risk reduced quickly within the first simulations: e.g., the risk reduced by 50 % after 1167 simulations (7 % of the 16500). This monotonic decrease in the overall residual risk Z c showed our approach identified high-risk points in a real dataset and for a large grid.
G. Sensitivity of parameter estimations
The sensitivity to inaccurate estimations of costs C F 1 c and probabilities p c was investigated in two studies on the French system. The first study focused on inaccurate estimations in a single contingency and the second on a systematic inaccuracy in all contingencies.
In the first study, the estimated cost or probability of a single, randomly selected contingency was α = 100 times higher/lower than the actuals C c = 1000 1001 and p c = 0.0005. The estimates were used to guide simulations and the actual parameters to compute the residual risk Z c . Then, the analysis of Z c allowed to judge the impact of inaccurate estimations. As it was expected, slightly slower reductions in risks were observed in the results in Fig. 9a . However, our probabilistic perspective that used these (inaccurate) parameters still significantly outperformed a standard classifier.
In the second study, the inaccuracy was systematic at α = 10 in all 11 contingencies either in costs C F 1 c or probabilities p c or superposed. The results in Fig. 9b showed risks increased significantly at α = 10 and reduced slightly at the inverse 1 α = 0.1. When superposed where the inaccuracy of all probabilities and costs were at α = 10 the risks increased drastically. Although our proposed approach was strongly affected it still outperformed a standard classifier.
H. Computations
The generation of the training database required time for simulations of faults that were on the French system 57 s per simulation on a computer cluster (actual DSA) [16] . The training and calibration of classifiers took on average 445 s on a standard notebook. However, this training only required being done once. A significant advantage of the proposed approach was that re-training was not required when the input parameters change as they were accounted instantaneously in the decision threshold applied to the classifier' output.
The prediction of an operating point in the short-term operation took 0.1 s. In comparison, the simulation of a single operating point required 57 s. This difference illustrated the main benefit of using machine-learning based DSA in the short-term operation. Our approach used this benefit and that actual DSA being always accurate.
I. Discussion
The probabilistic perspective showed promising results on addressing cost skewness and class imbalances of the asymmetric learning problem. Furthermore, inaccurate predictions are effectively reduced by identifying points entailing high risks. We have shown that in the French study, 25 % of simulations identify inaccurate predictions. The risk of relying on machine-learning based DSA reduces, even when parameters estimations were inaccurate to the extent of two orders of magnitudes. A key finding is that computations reduced by around 90 % in the online workflow. This finding enables also the possibility to account for many more contingency scenarios, which may become the key bottleneck of DSA approaches in the future, when many more flexible devices will be deployed in the system. An additional key benefit is that frequent changes in the estimations of input parameters can immediately taken into account.
In terms of limitations, these estimations of costs and probabilities may not be straightforward. More general limitations exist for machine-learning based DSA: e.g., the number of offline computations may be large as well, as the training database and classifiers need to be updated as the underlying probability distributions of the data changes over time.
V. CONCLUSION The challenges of machine-learning based DSA have been presented, showing that DSA can suffer from high operational risks when relying solely on machine-learning. In contrast, relying solely on traditional operating practices showed infeasible computational requirements. In response, we proposed a probabilistic perspective to address these disadvantages by using their advantages of machine-learning (fast) and traditional operating practices (accurate). A probabilistic output of machine learning was used to focus detailed assessments on highrisk contingencies while dealing with class imbalances and skewed costs of the training data. This probabilistic perspective on DSA can reduce the number of simulations in the shortterm operation by 95 %, gives insights into the operational risks involved and ensures a quantifiable risk tolerance level. Through a case study on a dataset of the French Transmission Grid, the proposed approach demonstrates to find the most critical contingencies and operating conditions. The proposed approach requires no parameter-tuning and can immediately consider changes in costs or probabilities of contingencies. This work enables, for the first time, to move from deterministic operating schemes to a probabilistic operating paradigm. We proposed a way to use traditional security schemes more effectively and allowing scaling to multiple contingencies and considering dynamics. In the future, the proposed approach will be tested considering multiple asset failures. And, as this work enables to operate assets closer to their limits, the cost benefits when moving to this probabilistic operating scheme should be quantified.
